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[L. A. No. 21044. In Bank. Nov. 8, 1950.] 
WALTER J. BECKER, A'ppellant. v. GRACE C. BECKER, 
; Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Disposition of Oommunity ProPert)'-Effect of De- c. 
cree.-Where an interlocutory divorce deeree provided that. 
on payment by pla"intifi within two years of a specified sU"'t 
representing one-half the value of the community property, 
defendant execute to plaintiff a conveyance of such property 
and this provision was adopted by the final decree and neither 
partyappeaJed from such decree, the court had nO power, on 
plaintiff's motion in the same action made nine years later, to 
modify the terms of the property settlement as set forth in the 
interlocutory decree. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County directing sale of community real property. 
Stanley N. Barnes, Judge. Reversed.' 
Charles Mursteinand Noel Edwards for Appellant. 1 
Keslar A Woo~ward and F~ ..Murray Keslar for Respondent. ~ 
CARTER, J.-on May 12, 1937, an interlocutory dt-cree'/ 
of divorce was granted defendant cross-complainant wife un" 
the ground of extreme cruelty; the final judgment was enter~J 
June 11, 1938. The interlocutory decrt:e of divorce proviileJ 
in the fifth paragraph as follows: "That within two years 
from the date 01 this interlocutory decree of divorce, cross-
defendant (plaintiff) shall pay to cross-complainant, the sum 
of Six Hundred Twenty-five and 00/100 Dollars ($625.00), 
in cash, said sum representing one-half Ph) the estimatE'd 
value of said two and one-half (2112) acres of land community 
property of the parties hereto; that on the payment by cross- i 
defendant of said sum of $625.00, cross-complainant (defend- . 
ant) will execute a good and sufficient instrument of eonvey-
ance to cross-defendant, or to such person or persons as he may 
direct to all her right, title and interest in and to said two 
and one-half (2112) acres of land; that until such conveyance 
is made, cross-defendant shall pay all taxes that may be or 
have been assessed or levied against said real estate." (Em-
[1] See 9 Cal.Jur. 762;17 Am.Jur. aM. 
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phasis added.) Tb,e final decree adopted the provisions of 
the interlocutory decree. 
Neither of the parties appealed nor made any attempt to 
comply with or enforce the terms of the judgment qntll 
.J uly 7, 1948 (except as will appear), when cross-defendant 
(plaintiff) made a motion in the same (divorce) action "to 
direct the defendant to execute a deed and to satisfy money 
judgment." Plaintiff alleged that 'on May 26th, 1948, he had 
tendered the sum of $625 with interest to the defendant who 
refused to accept it and that he was now ready, able and 
willing to pay that amount, plus interest, into court. In his 
affidavit he states that he had been unable to pay until that 
time; that he has expended approximately $1,000 since the 
interlocutory decree in filling in, and levelling the property. 
In the affidavit of the attorney for the defendant, it is alleged 
that plaintiff's failure to pay the money within the two-yt'ar 
period had the effect of leaving the ownership of the prop-
erty in the parties as tenants in common. It appears from 
the affidavit of a real estate broker that the plaintiff now has 
a buyer for the property who is willing to pay $24,750. 
The order appealed from provided that "IT Is HEREBY 
ORDERED, AD~ AND DECREED that plaintiff is entitlt'd to 
obtain title amd '(sic] sell tJl.e real property hereinaftl'r dl'-
scribed when he agrees to pay defendant one-half the pro-
ceeds of the ,ale after deducting the actual expenses of the 
sale, as well as the amount of taxes and improvements paid 
and expended by the plaintiff and that transaction should be 
handled through an escrow. . 
"IT Is FuRTHER ORDERED, ADJ'ODGED AND DEOBEED that th(' 
said motion of plaintiff to direct the defendant to execute a 
deed and to satisfy money judgment is granted conditionally, 
the condition being his acceptance of the foregoing pro-
cedure." [Emphasis added.) 
[1] Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial cou..--t was 
without jurisdiction to change the terms of the property settle-
ment as set forth in the interlocutory decree which was a con-
clusive adjudication of the property rights of the parties upon 
the expiration of the time for appeal and for relief pursuant 
to section 473, Code of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff maintains that when a judgment has become final, 
the judgment debtor has a right under section 675 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, on motion to order the judgment 
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this judgment has not actually been paid, but contends that 
a tender was made which worked a discharge of the lien 
given as collateral therefor, and that "The tender having been 
mane, it is equivalent to the satisfaction of the judgment and 
therefore the motion is proper." (As will hereinafter appear, 
this section of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application 
to the fads before us.) 
There are two questions presented by this appeal: (1) The 
interpretation of the two-year limitation in the interlocutory 
decree; and (2) the procedure to be followed to enforce the 
property rights of the parties. , 
This court has said recently (Taylor v. George, 340al.2d 
552, 557 [212 P.2d 505]) that" 'An interlocutory judgment 
of divorce is, therefore, so far as it determines the rights of 
the parties, a contract between them' " (quoting from Lcmcltm 
G. ~ A. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 181 Cal. 460,465 [184 
P. 864]). (See, also, Jones v. Union Oil 00.,218 Cal. 775 [25 
P.2d 5] ; M,,"ller v. Murphy, 186 Cal. 344 [199 P. 525] ; Weaver 
v. San Francisco, 146 Cal. 728 [81 P. 119].) The interpreta-
tion of such a decree is a question of law. (Union Oil 00. v. 
Union Sugar 00., 31 Cal.2d 800 [188 P.2d470]; Western 
Coal ~Mining Oo.v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819 [167 P.2d 7l~' ' 
164 A.L.R. 685]; Estate of Platt,21Ca1.2d 343 f131"}5~-
825) ; Estate of Pearson, 90 Cal.App.2d 436 (203 P.2d 52]; " 
Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299].) 
If we consider the interlocutory decree as a contract, it I 
would appear that by its terms the parties obtained mut\1n) '\ 
rights and were under mutual obligations-one to pay a cer· 
tain sum in return for which the other was to convey a certain 
one-half interest m real property. These promises were 
mutually concurrent and were, by the' terms of the decree, 
to be performed within two years from the date of the decree. 
The terms of the decree should have bt:.-en complied with 
during 'the two-year period, but were not. Likening it to a 
contract in which we assume that time was not of the essence, 
performance should have been within a reasonable time there-
after. Section 276 of the Restatement of Contracts provides 




the following rules are applicable: (d) In contracts for the ; 
sale or purchase of land delay of one party must be greater 
in order to discharge the duty of the other than in mercantile 
contracts. (e) In a suit for specific performance of a contract 
for the sale or purchase of laTHl. considerable delay in tender-
ing performance does not prl!c1ude enforcement of the contrae·t 
~ov.1950] BECXER 11. BECKER 
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where the delay can be compensated for by interest on the 
purchase money or otherwise, unless (i) the contract expressly 
states that performance at or within a given time is essential, 
or (ii) the nature of the contract, in view of the accompany-
ingcircumstances, is such that enforcement will work injus-
tice. "Section 1492 of the Civil Code is substantially the 
same as subdivision e(i) ·of the Restatement. That section 
. provides that "Where delay in performance is capable of 
exact and entire compensation, and time has not been expressly 
(leclared to be of the essence of the obligation. an offer of 
performance, accompanied with an offer of such compensation, 
may be made at any time after it is due, but Witllout preju-
dice to any rights acquired by the creditor, or by any other 
person, in the meantime." By his motion, plaintiff is, in 
effect, seeking specific performance of a contract which should 
have been performed within a reasonable time after the 
expiration of the two-year limitation. It would seem that, 
as a matter of law, it can be said that a nine-year delay is 
not a reasonable time. Section 3392 'of the Civil Code pro-
vides that "Specific performance cannot be· enforced in favor 
of a party who has not fully and fairly pt'rformed all the 
cOl1ditionspr~dent -on .his ..part -to-thL.gll.ligl!!io..!!_J)!. the_ 
.other party, except where his failure to perform is only 
partial, and either entirely immaterial, or capable of being 
fully compensated, in which- ease specific performance may 
be compelled, upon full compensation being made for the 
default. " Even where timt' is not of the essence, courts will 
not allow specific performanCt' after delay in tender, if enforce-
ment will work injustice, or whert' delay is inexcusable. 
(Cockn'll v. Boas, 213 Cal. 490 [2 P.2d7741; Mathews v. 
Davis, 102 Cal. 202 [36 P. 358] ; Boulenger v. Morison, 88 
Cal.App. 664 [264 P. 256].) It would seem that if plaintitI 
had been able, as he was, to expend $1,000 on improving the 
property, his plea of incapacity to comply with the decree 
is not too meritorious. And it would also appear that to 
enforce the original provisions as to payment will work a 
great injustice on defendant. 
It appears that the decree gave the parties a two-year 
period and a reasonable time thereafter to comply with its 
terms and that when that time exp.ired they would each hold 
an undivided one-half interest in the property as tenants 
in common. Tn other words, the result is thp same as it would 
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made in either the interlocutory or final divorce decrees. (6 
Cal.Jur.360.) _ 
This court has held many times that a divorce decree which 
adjudicates the property rights of the parties is not subject 
to modification regardless of whether or not it is based on 
agreement of the parties. (Codornu v. Codorniz, 34 Cal.2d :J 
811 [215 P.2d 32] ; Leupe v. Leupe,21 Cal.2d 145 [130 P.2d .~ 
697 J ; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265] ; Dupon"~ 
v. Dupont, 4 Ca1.2d 227 [48 P.2d 677] ; Ettlinger v. EttUnge"~ 
3 Ca1.2d 172 [44 P.2d 540J.) It would appear, as a result,-ii 
that had this motion been made at the end of the two-year 
period, or within a reasonable time thereafter, the trial court 
should have granted the motion by making an order com-
pelling defendant to convey her interest in the property upon 
payment of $625 as provided in the interlocutory decree. Sueh 
a motion was not made, however, and the provisions of the 
interlocutory decree purporting to make a division of the _" 
community property of the parties is now of no force and 
effect. The result is the same as if no disposition of such 
community property had been made, and the parties now 
hold title to the property as tenants in common. (Buller v. 
Buller, 62 Cal.App.2d 694 [145 P.2d 653] ; Lorraine v. Lor-
raine, 8 Cal.App.2d 687 [48 P.2d 48] ; Fieger v. Fieger, 2if 
Cal.App.2d 736 [83 P.2d 526].) It was, therefore, improper 
for the trial court to make an order in the same (divorce) 
action modifying the terms of the property settlement con-
tained in the interlocutory decree and which was incorporated 
by reference in the final decree of divorce. When the com-
munity interests are not determined in the interlocutory or 
final decree, the spouses must prove, in a separate action, the 
property to which they are entitled. (Green v. Green, 66 
Cal.App.2d 50, 57 [151 P.2d 679J; Lorrai~ v. Lorraine, 
IUpra; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1 [147 P. 1168J.) 
Par the foregoing reasons the order appealed from is 
reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-A judgment is not less a 
judgment when it is likened to a contract for certain purposes 
(Jones v. Union Oil Co., 218 Cal. 775, 778 [25 P.2d 5]; 
London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 181 Cal. 460. 
465-466 [184 P. 864] ; 1 Freeman, Judgments, § 6, pp. 10-11), 
or included within the meaning of the term "Contract" in 
) 
) 
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certain statutes (Taylor v. George, 34 Ca1.2d 552, 557 [212 
P.2d 505] ; Maler v. Murphy, 186 Cal. 344.347 [199 P. 525]). 
Its interpretation, effect, and enforcement are stilI subject 
to the rules of law governing judgments. Thus an action on 
a judgment is governed by the statute of limitations relating· 
to judgments (Code Civ. Proe., § 336(1)), and not by those 
relating to contracts (Oode Civ. Proe., §§ 337[11.83911]; 
al'e, also, Dore v. Thornburgh, 90 Cal. 64, 66 {27 P. 30, 25 
Am.St.Rep. 100]; 1 Freeman, Judgments, §§ 5-6, pp. 7-]3). 
Sections 681 to 713% of the Code of Civil Procedure govern· 
ing the enforcement of judgments govern the enforeemPllt 
of. the interlocutory decree in the present case. They C&nU()1 
be supplanted by principles at variance therewith based on all 
analogy between contracts and judgments. . 
The decree in the present ease ordered that "within tW(I 
years from the date of this interlocutory decree of divorc(' 
I plaintiff] shall pay to [defendant], the sum of Six H undrt'c1 
Twenty Five and 00/100 Dollars . . . that on the payment 
by [plaintiff] of said sum of $625, [defendant] will execute i 
a good and sufficient instrument of conveyance to [plaintiff) ; 
. . . to all her right, title and interest in and to said . . . 
land. Jt The decree did not make a presently effective disposi-
tion of the community prope:tty (cl., Wilson v. WilBon, 76 
Cal.App.2d 119, 130 [172 P.2d 568]), or effect any transfer 
of the legal title thereto. It merely ordered the parties to 
.perform certain acts upon performance of which plaintiff 
would become the sole owner of the real property in question. 
Like a conditional decree for specific performance of a eon-
tract for the sale of real property (see Epstein v. G~, 233 
N.Y. 490, 494 [135 N.E. 861]), the interlocutory decree merely 
created reciprocal rights and obligations in both parties 
enforceable by either on a tender of the performance due 
from him under the terms of the decree. The enforcement of 
the decree as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdietiolJ 
is governed by the provisions of sections 681 and 685 of th(· 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
Execution on a judgment will issue as a matter of right fol' 
a period of five years from the date of entry. (Dt CorI'O v. 
Di Corpo, 83 Cal.2d 195, 201 [200 P.2d 529] ; Wolle v. Wolfe. 
30 Cal.2d 1, 4 [180 P.2d 345] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 681.) Tbl' 
decree in the present case in effect postponed enfoTcement 
thercof by defendant for two Yl'llrs: b~·. not appealing froDl 
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A. Co. v. Industrial Acc~ Com., supra.) When enforcement of 
a judgment is postponed for a specified period, the time dur..;", 
ing which it is postponed "must be excluded from the com- '; 
putation of the five years within which execution may issue. 't; 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 681:) Defendant was therefore entitled 
: to enforce the judgment at any time within five years after 
performance by plaintiff became due, or a maximum of 
seven years after entry of the decree. Enforcement by plain- , 
tiff, however, was not postponed; he could compe] the execu_-c 
tion of a deed by deferidant at any time after entry of the. 
decree upon tender of $625. Section 681 therefore limits 
enforcement by plaintiff as a matter of right to a period of 
five years after entry of the decree. The majority opinion, 
however, holds by analogy to contract law that the judgment 
may be enforced only for two years "plus a reasonable time" 
thereafter. What is a reasonable time will depend on the 
circumstances of each case. It may be less than five years 
after performance becomes due. The rule of the majority , 
opinion is directly in conflict with the statutory provision, 
that the judgment is enforceable as a matter of right for a 
period of five years from the date of its entry, excluding any 
time during which enforcement is stayed or postponed by 
order of the court'- 'The' iitterrule -mustgovern--;--shl.ce it is 
the rule controlling the enforcement of judgments. ';;' 
When more than five years have elapsed from the date 0 
entry of judgment, subject to the exclusion of any time dur-
ing which execution is postponed, issuance of a writ of execu-
tion is not a matter of right, but a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. The writ may then issue "by 
leave of the ,court, upon motion . . . accompanied by an 
affidavit or affidavits setting forth the reasons for failure to 
proceed in compliance with the provisions of section 681 of 
this code. The failure to set forth such reasons as shall, in 
the discretion of the court, be sufficient, shall be ground for 
the denial of the motion." (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.) Plaintiff ._....; 
did not seek to enforce the judgment until more than 11 years 
had elapsed since the date of entry thereof. The trial court , 
found that his failure to seek execution at an earlier date i 
was not justified and denied his motion. The evidence set 
forth in the majority opinion demonstrates that the denial 
of the motion was not an abuse of the court'8 discretion under 
section 685. (Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, supra, 200; Willia"", 
v. Goodin, 17 Cal.App.2d 62, 64-65 [61 P.2d 507]; Wheeler 
v. Eldred, 121 Cal. 28, 29, 30 [53 P. 431, 66 Am.St.Rep. 20] J 
) 
,.) 
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Badonich v. Badonich, 130'Cal.App. 250, 254 [20 P.2d 51].) 
The trial court must, ona motion under section 685, issue. 
or deny the writ of execution. It has no power to modify the 
judgment. (Parker v. Parker, 203 Cal. 787, 795 [266 P. 283]; 
WeZdon v. Rogers, 154 Cal. 632,634-635 [98 P.1070].) The 
interlocutory decree was not appealed and it has long since 
become final. Trial courts cannot modify or amend their 
judgments except as prescribed by statute (Bowman v. Bow-
man, 29- Cal.2d 808, 814 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246]) and 
there is no statutory authority for the modification of the 
decree in the present caSe. (Bowman v. Bowman, supra; 
Estate of Burnett, 11 Cal.2d 259, 262 [79 P.2d 89] ; BarllltD 
v. Oity Oouncil of Inglewood, 32 Cal.2d 688, 692-693 [197 
P.2d 721J ; Lankton v. Superior Oourt, 5 Cal.2d 694, 698 [55 
P.2d 1170]; 2 McBaine, California Trial & Appellate Prac-
tice, §§ 872-874, pp. 204-214; see, also, Leupe v. Leupe, 21 
Cal.2d 145.148 [130 P.2d 697}.) 
There is no question of the power of the court in the inter-
locutory decree to make a presently effective disposition of 
the community property. as in Leupe v Leupe, 21 Ca1.2d 
145 [130 P.2d 697}, in which the trial court presently awarded 
the husband certain pe~nal property, 8llbject to a lien 
thereon to secure payments to the Wife for her interest therein. 
In such a case, the decree of its own force and effect disposes 
of the community property and transfers the title thereto. 
(0/., Wilson V" Wilson,76 Cal.App.2d 119, 130, 133 [172 P.2d 
568].) In the present case, however, the trial court did Dot 
purport to make a presently effective disposition of the com-
munity property. Tit1e thereto could not be altered ortran8-
ferred without the performance of additional acts by the 
parties, viz., the payment of $625 by plaintiff to defendant 
and the execution of a deed by defendant to plaintiff. The 
situation with respect to that property therefore is governed 
by the rules applicable to the disposition of community prop-
erty when the decree makes no provision therefor. The mar-
riage was Dot dissolved by the interlocutory decree and no 
present disposition of the community property was made 
therein, so that it remained community property until the 
entry of the final decree. {Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 10 
(103 P. 488, 134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880].) If 
neither the final· nor the interlocutory decree mentions the 
community property, or if thp trial (,Ollrt finds that certain 
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position thereof, the parties upon the entry of the final decree; 
become tenants in common of that property. (Tarien v. Kat.,' 
216 Oal. 554, 559 [15 P.2d 493, 85 A.L.R. 334]; Buller 'f. 
Buller, 62 Oal.App.2d 694, 698 [145 P.2d 653]; Fieger v.; 
Fieger, 28 Oal.App.2d 736, 738 [83 P.2d 526].) In the present' 
case, therefore, plaintiff and defendant at the time of thE' entr, 
of the final decree became tenants in common of the real J" 
property in question, since no present disposition thereof, 
was made. Defendant held title to her nndivided half inter~' 
est subject to her duty ullder the decree to convey that inter,., 
est to plaintiff upon his payment of $625 to her. Until that . 
conveyance was made, hOwever, legal title rested in both par-
ties as tenants in common. Its transfer was not effected by a 
decree directing that certain acts be done that would effect 
its transfer. Since the trial court in the exercise of a sound 
discretion determined that the decree could not be enforced 
on plaintiff's motion therefor, the respective interests ot, 
the parties in the real property may not be determined with 
reference to the divorce decree but must be adjudicated in ': 
all independent action brought for that purpose. (Tarien v.1 
Katz, supra; Buller v. Buller, supra; Brown v. Brown, 170,,1 
Cal. I, 3 [147 P. 1168]; Lorr:S'ine v. Lorraine, 8 Oal.App.2d i 
i>87,698 [48 P.2d 48] pflstateO]BriX,-ls-:1C'aT667:'676 [186; 
P. 135] ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 202 Cal. 312, 318'i 
[260 P. 545].)- .. -. __ '-- -
I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal. 
I think that the decree, properly construed, finally disposed 
of all community property. Among other things, it awarded 
$625 to defendant. This award was unconditional but plaintiff 
was expressly allowed two years within which to make the 
payment, before defendant could have execution to collect it. 
Subject to making such paYlr',ent, and otherwise equally 
unconditionally, the property in question was awarded to 
plaintiff. There was no alternative for either the award of 
the money or the award of the property. All community in-
terests and rights of the parties were completely determined 
by this judgment. 
The effect of the provisions of the judgment is that the 
property was awarded to plaintiff but subjected to a lien to 
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ment did ftotdeclare that time was of the essence of any of 
its provisions or that any rights therein created or deter-
mined were to be divested by lapse of time or any other 
occurrence. The two-year period was, in a sense, a stay of 
execution; at any time after the two years and within five 
years thereafter defendant could have had execution issue 
as of course. Likewise, either within the two years or within 
five years thereafter, plainti1f could, as of course, have paid 
the $625 with legal interest and have had the property cleared 
of the lien. 
It seems to me to be llllSound law and undesirable policy 
to require, as do a concurring majority, that the parties 
engage in new and independent litigation to resettle their 
property rights. Those rights have been once fully deter-
mined and the judgment making such determination has 
become final. If new litigation such as the majority suggest 
had been instituted within five years from entry of the judg-
ment would not a plea of res judicata have been unanswer-
ableT If the rights were res judicata then, by what process 
have they since become not res judicata T The parties have 
suggested and research has disclosed no prior case in Cali-
fornia wherein, after full determination of community prop-
erty rights in a judgment 'Of divorce which has become final, 
this court has ordered the parties to relitigate their rights in 
an independent action. 
I think that the judgment, long since final, cannot now be 
modified either in respect to its effect on the status of the 
parties or its allocation of property rights. The only ques-
tion, as I see it, is one relating to enforcement. Can it now 
be enforced by plainti1f f In view of the fact that defendant 
at any time after the two-year stay and within five years there-
after could have had, as of course, and thereafter upon a 
reasonable showing, execution to enforce the judgment, and 
failed to ask its enforcement, I fail to see how she is preju-
diced by the delay of plainti1f in making a tender of full per-
formance on his part. Having security for eventual payment 
it is conceivable that she may have preferred to keep the $625 
accumulating interest at the l~gal rate of 7 per cent per annum. 
There is no contention that she has not accepted other provi-
sions of the judgment which went to her benefit. Under the 
circumstances I think that not only did the trial court have 
power to enforce the judgment, but that its failure to do so 
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For the r~ons above stated I concur in the judgment of 
n;:~J .. eon.....a ••. \' .. 
Appellant's petition for a rehE'aringwM denied December 
'I, 1950. Schauer, J.,and Spence,J., voted for a rehearing. 
